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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2005, Sanofi-Aventis, the makers of the allergy 
tablet Allegra, announced plans that it would launch a generic 
version of its drug in the marketplace.1  Sanofi-Aventis had 
recently lost a court battle to Barr Pharmaceuticals in connection 
with Allegra patents, which marked the end of Allegra’s exclusive 
claim on the market.2  This move by Sanofi-Aventis to launch a 
generic Allegra can be seen as a new permutation of its battle with 
Barr Pharmaceuticals; however, instead of combating in court, 
Sanofi-Aventis has found a new mode of attack in the marketplace. 
The battle between such pharmaceutical companies as Sanofi-
Aventis and Barr Pharmaceuticals can be classically deemed a 
struggle for economic profit.  Generally, the process of bringing a 
new drug to market takes about twelve years, and typically costs a 
pharmaceutical company around $359 million.3  It has been 
estimated that only one in five thousand of a pharmaceutical 
company’s compounds make it to the second round of testing 
while only one in five of those receive final approval.4  
Pharmaceutical companies take huge gambles for the hard-earned 
right to sell new drugs to consumers and should rightly expect to 
 
 1 See Sanofi-Aventis, Press Release, Sanofi-aventis group enters agreement with 
Prasco Laboratories to market generic versions of ALLEGRA® (fexofenadine HCl), 
(Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://en.sanofi-aventis.com/press/ppc_26088.asp? 
ComponentID=26088&SourcePageID=24929. 
 2 See In re Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 430 (D. N.J. 2005). 
 3 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: 
COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS, OTA–H–522, at 15 (Feb. 1993), available at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk1/1993/9336_n.html [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT]. 
 4 CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. 
BETH 2/3/2006  11:28 AM 
2005] AUTHORIZED GENERICS 357 
recoup their investment and make a profit.  Pharmaceutical 
companies arguably provide a public good in the form of useful 
products that benefit the public’s welfare.  While patent rights 
guarantee market exclusivity for a finite period to innovator 
pharmaceutical companies (“innovators”),5 one debated issue in 
the pharmaceutical industry revolves around the transition time 
between the innovators’ market exclusivity and the generic drug 
manufacturers’ (“generics”) entry into the market. 
Most innovators want to hold off any dilution of their market 
by generic drugs that compete with their brand-name product for as 
long as possible.6  The financial incentive to do so is clear.  
However, a battle over the billion dollar drug market7 inevitably 
ensues as the generics seek to gain access to the market to profit on 
the sale of new drugs. 
One new and controversial tactic employed by innovators in 
this battle is the “authorized generic.”8  An authorized generic is a 
brand-name drug which is licensed by an innovator to another 
company to be marketed as a generic drug.9  This tactic may seem 
counterintuitive because, as noted before, the innovators aim to 
keep generic competition off the market for as long as possible.  
However, this tactic is employed in very specific situations.  Under 
certain circumstances, a single generic manufacturer is awarded 
the right to have exclusive entry in the generic market before other 
generics.10  The exclusive entry by a generic drug manufacturer 
 
 5 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (stating that a person who, without authority, makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention during the term of the patent infringes the 
patent). 
 6 See CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 
19–21. 
 7 Drug Pricing & Consumer Costs: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Commerce 
Committee, 107th Cong. 3 (Apr. 23, 2003) (statement of Kathleen D. Jaeger, President & 
CEO, Generic Pharmaceutical Association), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/ 
hearings/042302jaegar.pdf (stating that consumers spent $121.8 billion on prescription 
drugs) [hereinafter Jaeger Senate Hearing Statement]. 
 8 See Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P–0563, at 4 (Dec. 23, 2004), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04p0563/04p-0563-cp0000-01-
vol1.pdf [hereinafter Andrx Petition]. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (Supp. 2005); see infra Part I.B. 
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constitutes the first arrival of an innovator’s competition in the 
market. 
In this context, the innovator might find the practice of 
marketing authorized generics to be useful.  The innovator might 
find it more profitable to simultaneously market its brand-name 
drug at a higher, brand-name price and also sell the drug under a 
generic label at a lower, generic price.  Such a practice would both 
increase sales profits and undercut the market of the exclusive-
entry generic manufacturer because of increased competition by 
the authorized generic on the market. 
Fundamentally, this practice seems unfair to consumers 
because the exact same drug, manufactured by the same innovator, 
is offered for sale at two different prices, but only one of the drugs 
bears the brand-name label.  Although the practice of authorizing 
generics may be a result of the warfare between innovators and 
generics, it also preys on the inaccurate beliefs of many consumers 
that generic drugs contain slightly different active ingredients or 
lower doses of the same ingredients than brand-name drugs.11  
Consumers may benefit from cheaper prices offered in the generic 
market for the first time for the drug, but the lack of disclosure is 
still problematic.  If a consumer were aware that a generic drug 
was actually a brand-name drug sold at a lower price, he would 
most likely be unwilling to pay a premium for the brand-name 
drug with the “correct” label. 
Complicating the mix even further are the rights of the generic 
companies.  Once several companies are manufacturing and 
marketing a generic drug, each generic manufacturer, individually, 
might feel little impact from the addition of another generic on the 
market.  However, the impact would be felt in the circumstance 
where a single generic manufacturer is awarded the right of 
exclusive entry in the generic market.  The authorized generic 
would undercut the market of the exclusive-entry generic and may 
force the exclusive-entry generic to lower its price. 
The battle between innovators and generics over market entry 
has taken various turns in the last decade,12 but the use of 
 
 11 Andrx Petition, supra note 8, at 2. 
 12 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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authorized generics has sharply increased in the last few years.13  
In 2003, Congress enacted The Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act14 (“Medicare Amendments”) 
to foster greater access to affordable health care.  The legislation 
was enacted in part to restore a balance between the interests of 
innovators and generics, which had been upset because of the 
abuse of previous legislation by innovators.15  Specifically, the 
Medicare Amendments addressed a number of issues that had 
arisen in the interpretation of the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments.16  For several years, a number of 
loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments were exploited by 
innovators who sought to keep a corner on the market for the drugs 
they had developed.17  The Medicare Amendments sought to 
restore a balance between the generics and innovators by 
addressing those loopholes.18  Currently, the new controversial 
tactic of authorized generics employed by innovators arguably 
defeats the purpose of the recent legislation.  However, the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and federal courts have found 
the use of authorized generics to be statutorily permissible.19 
Part I of this Note explains the history of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments with a particular focus on the original intent of the 
law which sought to improve consumer access to affordable 
prescription drugs.  Part II explains the Medicare Amendments, 
which sought to maintain the balance between the competing 
 
 13 Glenn Singer, Industry’s Biggest Manufacturers Enter Generics Through Loophole; 
Consumers, Smaller Firms Could Suffer, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 10, 2005, at 1E. 
 14 Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 15 Representative Henry A. Waxman, Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals (May 8, 
2002), http://www.house.gov/waxman/news_files/news_statements_afford_drugs_5_ 
8_02.htm (describing the objective of the legislation as restoring the balance intended by 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments by encouraging low-cost generic drugs and rewarding 
brand name drug companies) [hereinafter Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on 
Affordable Pharmaceuticals]. 
 16 Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 17 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 18 See Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra 
note 15. 
 19 See discussion infra Part III. 
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interests of generics and innovators and to achieve the goals 
embodied in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  Part III explores 
the current controversial use of authorized generics by innovators 
to capture a share of the market and the state of the law regarding 
that tactic.  Part IV of this Note evaluates the legal analysis which 
permits innovators to profit from authorized generics.  Part V of 
this Note offers a possible resolution to the use of authorized 
generics.  This Note argues that the use of authorized generics 
upsets the careful balance between innovators and generics, which 
is a central tenet of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the 
Medicare Amendments.20  Finally, this Note suggests that a 
restriction on an innovator’s use of authorized generics through 
drug labeling would accomplish greater access to affordable 
pharmaceuticals by fostering balance between innovators and 
generics. 
I. History of the Drug Price Competition and  
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984  
(Hatch-Waxman Amendments) 
A. The 1962 Amendment of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act 
The FDA is the regulatory body that controls nearly every 
aspect of the development and marketing of pharmaceuticals, 
including clinical testing, the safety and effectiveness of new 
drugs, as well as the contents of advertisements for drugs.21  
Without FDA approval, no new drug can be marketed in the 
United States.22  In order to improve the safety and effectiveness of 
pharmaceuticals, Congress passed legislation in 1962 that 
dramatically altered the drug approval process.23  The 1962 
 
 20 See Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra 
note 15. 
 21 See United States Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2005). 
 22 See Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C § 355(a) (2000) (requiring FDA 
approval for new drugs). 
 23 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
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Amendment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”) requires the FDA to positively determine that a drug is 
safe before it enters commercial distribution and to consider 
whether new drugs are effective for the purposes for which they 
are intended.24 
A manufacturer seeking to market a drug that has not 
previously been approved by the FDA is required by the FDCA to 
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the FDA.25  NDAs are 
usually long and detailed.  They must include, among other things, 
evidence regarding the drug’s safety and effectiveness and 
information about any patents held by the NDA that could 
reasonably be asserted to cover the drug in question.26  
Specifically, the application must contain the patent number and 
expiration date of any patent claiming the drug or a method of 
using the drug upon which the NDA holder could file a claim of 
patent infringement “if a person not licensed by the owner 
engag[es] in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”27  After the 
NDA is approved, the FDA is required to publish the submitted 
patent information in a report called “Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” which is commonly 
referred to as the Orange Book.28 
Under the 1962 Amendment, both innovators and generics had 
to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of their drug products 
through clinical trials.29  Therefore, if a generic wanted to market a 
drug after the innovator’s patent had expired, the generic would 
have to repeat extensive clinical trials to prove the drug’s safety 
and effectiveness to the FDA.30  A generic took the risk of having a 
 
 24 Id. at 784. 
 25 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b) (1999), amended by 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1) (Supp. 2005). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See id. § 355(b)(1). 
 28 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2000); see also Electronic Orange Book: Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). 
 29 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They 
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 396–97 (1999). 
 30 Joseph P. Reid, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter a Pill for the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 
314 (1999). 
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patent infringement suit filed against it by an innovator if the 
generic began conducting these trials before the drug patent 
expired.31 
 
B. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 1984 
In the early 1980s, both houses of Congress introduced bills to 
expedite generic drug approvals and to stimulate competition 
between innovators and generics.32  However, it was not until the 
98th Congress (1983-1985), when Representative Henry Waxman, 
Senator Orrin Hatch, and members of the innovator and generic 
drug industries began negotiations, that the Hatch-Waxman 
legislation was enacted.33  The Hatch-Waxman legislation “was 
predicated on the desire to enhance the growth of the generic drug 
industry while simultaneously extending patent protection for 
brand name drugs developed by the research-based industry.”34  
The Senate and House approved S. 2748 and H.R. 3605, 
respectively, in September 1984.35  President Ronald Reagan 
signed the Hatch-Waxman Amendments into law on September 
24, 1984.36  In the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Congress 
attempted to strike a balance between two competing policy 
interests: (i) encouraging the research and development of new 
drugs and (ii) enabling generics to bring low-cost copies of those 
drugs to market.37 
For innovators, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments provide a 
number of incentives, including: (i) patent term extensions to 
compensate for delays during regulatory review of the brand-name 
product;38 (ii) mandatory notice by generics seeking to challenge 
 
 31 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 32 See Frederick Tong, Widening the Bottleneck of Pharmaceutical Patent Exclusivity, 
24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775 (2003). 
 33 See id. at 780–82. 
 34 Bill To Ease Way for Generics Is Introduced in the House, CHAIN DRUG REV., June 
4, 2001, at RX11. 
 35 Engelberg, supra note 29, at 404. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 38 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000). 
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patents covering the brand-name drug;39 (iii) up to a thirty-month 
stay of generic approval during patent litigation;40 and (iv) market 
exclusivity of three and five-year periods under special 
circumstances.41 
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments favor the interests of 
generics by allowing for an efficient regulatory proposal known as 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).42  In an 
ANDA, a generic must demonstrate its drug’s “bioequivalence” 
with the previously approved brand-name product.43  However, 
ANDA applicants may rely on the innovator’s previous studies and 
are no longer required to repeat the expensive and lengthy clinical 
trials that had been required by law.44  To establish bioequivalence, 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments require that a generic drug must 
have the same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage 
form, strength, and labeling requirements as the brand-name drug 
approved in an NDA.45  Although these requirements are stringent, 
establishing bioequivalence poses less of a burden than satisfying 
the requirements to complete an NDA application because the 
ANDA applicant is able to rely on the FDA’s findings of safety 
and effectiveness for the brand-name drug. 46  As a result, generics 
are able to shorten the time period for approval and avoid much of 
the research and development costs that would be otherwise 
necessary to bring a new drug to market. 
In the interest of innovators, however, the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments continue to provide protection to the innovator 
whose patent rights have yet to expire.  In order to secure FDA 
approval, the ANDA applicant must certify that its generic version 
of the approved drug will not interfere with any patents that the 
 
 39 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. 2005). 
 40 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 41 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (awarding a five-year market exclusivity to companies 
innovating drugs containing a new chemical entity, and awarding companies making 
improvements to already improved drugs three years of exclusivity). 
 42 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (1999), amended by U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (Supp. 2005). 
 43 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(F) (2000). 
 44 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (1999), amended by U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (Supp. 2005); see 
also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(3) (2005). 
 45 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii), (j)(4)(D)(i)–(ii) (2000). 
 46 See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 
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NDA holder has listed.47  That is, the ANDA applicant must certify 
one of the following for each patent listed in the Orange Book that 
claims the drug for which the ANDA applicant is seeking 
approval: (i) no such patent information has been submitted to the 
FDA; (ii) the patent has expired; (iii) the patent is set to expire on a 
certain date; or (iv) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new generic drug for which the 
ANDA application is submitted.48  These are commonly referred to 
as paragraph I, II, III and IV certifications.  The first three 
certifications can be handled directly by the FDA, but the fourth 
certification requires a court’s involvement because it necessitates 
a determination of whether the patent is valid or whether it will be 
infringed by the generic.49 
To balance the interests of innovators and generics, the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments require that, after filing a paragraph IV 
certification, an ANDA applicant who wishes to challenge the 
patent during the patent term must give notice to the NDA-
holder/patentee within twenty days of the filing.50  The notice must 
include a statement detailing the factual and legal basis upon which 
the ANDA applicant’s belief rests that the patent is invalid or will 
not be infringed.51  If the certification is under paragraph IV, “the 
approval shall be made effective immediately”52 unless the patent 
holder files an infringement action in the district court within forty-
five days of receiving the notice.53  If the patent holder files suit, 
“the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the 
thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the 
notice,”54 unless the district court rules on the infringement claim 
within the thirty-month period55 or the patent expires.  If the 
district court issues a ruling during the thirty-month stay period, 
the ANDA approval date is determined by the decision of the 
 
 47 See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 48 See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). 
 49 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i)–(iii) (Supp. 2005). 
 50 See id. § 355(b)(3)(B)(i). 
 51 See id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II). 
 52 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
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district court, or by the decision of the appellate court, if it is 
appealed.56  During the forty-five day period in which the patent 
holder can file an infringement action, the ANDA applicant is 
barred from filing a declaratory judgment action with respect to the 
patent at issue.57  If no infringement action is filed during this 
forty-five day period, the FDA may immediately approve the 
ANDA.58 
For generics, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments give further 
incentives to the first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV 
certification.  The generic who files an ANDA application first and 
successfully litigates an ensuing patent dispute is granted a 180-
day period of marketing exclusivity.59  During this period, the FDA 
may not approve a subsequent generic applicant’s ANDA 
application for the same drug product.60  The innovator’s premium-
priced, brand-name product is the only product competing with the 
generic that obtains the exclusive marketing period.  Generics are 
therefore given an economic incentive to challenge the validity of 
listed patents.61  Under the original Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 
this six-month exclusivity period typically began on the date of the 
first commercial marketing of the drug by the first applicant.62  
However, the original Hatch-Waxman Amendments also provided 
that the commencement of the exclusivity period could be 
triggered by “the date of a decision of a court . . . [which holds] the 
patent which is the subject of the certification [is] invalid or not 
infringed.”63 
In order to deal with potential patent infringement concerns, 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments provide that it is not an act of 
patent infringement to engage in acts necessary to prepare an 
 
 56 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa), (II)(aa)(AA). 
 57 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), (j)(5)(C). 
 58 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 59 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). 
 60 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY 
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at 13 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter FTC GENERIC DRUG 
STUDY]. 
 61 See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 60, at 57. 
 62 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2005). 
 63 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–58 (2003). 
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ANDA application which would otherwise constitute infringing 
acts.64  However, the Act also provides that, if an ANDA applicant 
attempts to obtain approval for a generic drug claimed by a valid 
and unexpired patent, the applicant infringes a patent by filing an 
ANDA.65  In this context, no monetary damages would exist 
because the generic would not have yet sold any product because 
the thirty-month stay provision would have been triggered by the 
infringement suit.66  Therefore, the innovator would not have 
suffered from the activities of the generic manufacturer.  In 
exceptional cases, an ANDA applicant may be penalized for 
willfully infringing a patent.67  In cases of willful infringement, the 
patentee is awarded reasonable attorney’s fees.68 
C. Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
In the years following enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
legislation, the generic drug industry experienced significant 
growth.69  The availability of generic drugs increased and the 
generic share in the overall prescription drug market grew from 19 
percent in 1984 to 45 percent in 2001 and realized more than $11 
billion in annual sales.70  A 1998 study by the Congressional 
Budget Office (“CBO”), comparing brand-name and generic prices 
for twenty-one different brand-name drugs facing generic 
competition between 1991 and 1993, found that the average retail 
price of a generic prescription drug in 1994 was less than half the 
 
 64 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 65 See id. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
 66 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2005). 
 67 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Jaeger Senate Hearing Statement, supra note 7, at 3; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND 
RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at ix (July 1998), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf [hereinafter CBO REPORT ON EFFECT 
OF GENERIC DRUGS IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY]. 
 70 Jaeger Senate Hearing Statement, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that consumers spent 
$11 billion on generic drugs and that 45 percent of prescription drugs sold were generic); 
CBO REPORT ON EFFECT OF GENERIC DRUGS IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 
69, at ix (finding that 19 percent of prescription drugs sold were generic). 
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average retail price of a brand-name prescription drug.71  The CBO 
study estimated that “in 1994, purchasers saved a total of $8 billion 
to $10 billion on prescriptions at retail pharmacies by substituting 
generic drugs for their brand-name counterparts.”72 
According to the CBO study, generic competition was also 
good for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.  “Between 
1983 and 1995, investment in [research and development] as a 
percentage of pharmaceutical sales by brand-name drug companies 
increased from 14.7 percent to 19.4 percent.  Over the same period, 
U.S. pharmaceutical sales by those companies rose from $17 
billion to $57 billion . . . .”73  The effect of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments also benefited innovators by extending their average 
exclusive marketing period.  The average period of time between 
the entrance of a brand-name drug into the market and the 
expiration of its patent increased from nine years in 1984 to eleven 
or twelve years during the years 1992 through 1995.74 
In spite of the legislation, the market is still dominated by 
brand-name pharmaceuticals.  Although a generic drug may 
immediately capture about 60 percent of the market share within 
its first year of entry, the price for a generic drug is, on average, 
only 61 percent of the price for a brand-name drug during the first 
month of entry by the generic drug and drops to 37 percent within 
two years.75  More significantly, by the year 2000, the average 
brand-name prescription was priced 340 percent higher than its 
generic equivalent ($65.29 versus $19.33).76 
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments increased generic drug entry 
in the market, but they were also vulnerable to abuse by brand-
 
 71 CBO REPORT ON EFFECT OF GENERIC DRUGS IN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra 
note 69, at 28–32. 
 72 Id. at xiii. 
 73 Id. at xv. 
 74 See id. at 38. 
 75 See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT’L J. OF TECH. MGMT. 98, 105–06 (2000). 
 76 Kirking et al., Economics and Structure of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 
J. OF THE AM. PHARM. ASS’N 578, 579 (2001). 
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name manufacturers.77  The terms of the original Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments created incentives for anticompetitive behavior.  
There were three primary abuses: (i) late additions of patents 
unrelated to the basic functioning of the drug; (ii) frivolous patent 
infringement lawsuits; and (iii) collusive arrangements between 
brand-name and generic companies.78 
First, innovators abused the original Act by filing 
inconsequential patents prior to the expiration of their original 
patents in order to prevent competition from generics.79  The 
practice of filing frivolous patents furthered the second abusive 
practice.  By filing these lawsuits, innovators sought to trigger the 
thirty-month automatic stay provision on patents that would 
otherwise expire.80  The thirty-month stay provision was intended 
to allow patent holders to sue potential infringers before they 
received FDA approval.81  However, innovators manipulated this 
provision by listing multiple, meritless patents with the intent of 
creating opportunities to trigger this automatic stay and to reap the 
economic benefit of the market exclusivity.82  Lastly, innovators 
began entering into competition-stifling agreements with generics 
who had been granted a 180-day period of market exclusivity over 
other generics.83  Although the 180-day exclusivity provision was 
created as a reward to encourage generics to challenge weak 
patents,84 it became a device used by innovators to keep all 
generics from receiving FDA approval.85  Innovators would pay 
the first generic not to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period, thus 
indefinitely preventing all subsequent approval of ANDA 
applications.86 
 
 77 See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 60, at 3–4 (stating that one of the 
purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments was to enable earlier generic entry); 
Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra note 15. 
 78 Waxman Statement Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra note 
15. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 60, at 42. 
 82 Id. at 52–56. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 62–63. 
 86 Id. 
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II. THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT 
In response to the abuses by innovator drug companies of the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments’ legal framework, the Senate voted 
on June 19, 2003, to include the Greater Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals Amendment to the Senate Medicare bill.87  On 
June 27, 2003, the House passed its own version of a Medicare 
prescription drug bill that also contained provisions for greater 
access to generic drugs.88  Finally, on December 8, 2003, President 
George W. Bush signed into law the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act (“Medicare Amendments”).89  
The FDA subsequently revised its rules to be consistent with the 
new legislation.90 
Title XI of the Medicare Amendments, entitled “Access to 
Affordable Pharmaceuticals,” implemented significant changes to 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.91  In addition to other concerns, 
the Medicare Amendments sought to address the various 
anticompetitive loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  
Some of the changes include: (i) new remedies for the generic 
applicant;92 (ii) new requirements for the events that trigger the 
generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity period;93 and (iii) 
restrictions on brand-name drug manufacturers’ thirty-month stay 
necessary to resolve infringement disputes involving patents listed 
in the Orange Book.94 
 
 87 Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, S. 1225, 108th Cong. (1st 
Session 2003). 
 88 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, 108TH CONGRESS, 
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT, at CRS–11 (updated Jan. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB10105.pdf 
[hereinafter CRS HATCH-WAXMAN ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS]. 
 89 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (1999), amended by 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (Supp. 2005) (including 
the amendments made to the statute by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066. (2003)). 
 90 CRS HATCH-WAXMAN ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, supra note 88, at CRS–6–7. 
 91 Id. at CRS–7–8. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
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A. New Remedies for Generics 
First, the Medicare Amendments provide that a generic may 
initiate a civil action against an NDA-holder in order to “obtain 
patent certainty.”95  Specifically, if the patentee does not bring an 
infringement action within forty-five days after receiving 
paragraph IV notice, the ANDA applicant may bring a civil action 
“for a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the drug for which the applicant seeks 
approval . . . .”96  The provision also requires that the ANDA 
applicant must offer the patentee confidential access to its 
application for infringement evaluation.97  The new cause of action 
is primarily designed for the benefit of generics so that they may 
control the risk of potential litigation.  Prior to the Medicare 
Amendments, an innovator could refuse to file an infringement suit 
within the forty-five day period following its notice of a paragraph 
IV certification, give up the thirty-month stay provision and wait to 
initiate patent litigation after the generic had received FDA 
approval and had begun to market and sell its product.  The 
damages awarded in a patent infringement suit are much greater if 
a generic had marketed the drug.98  Therefore, if an ANDA 
applicant received FDA approval after filing an unchallenged 
paragraph IV certification, the ANDA applicant could then either 
market its generic product under the threat of a potential lawsuit or 
abandon the product.  Now, ANDA applicants may obtain 
certainty regarding potential patent challenges prior to entering the 
market. 
The Medicare Amendments also allow the ANDA applicant to 
assert a counterclaim to de-list a patent in the Orange Book.99  
Although not an independent cause of action, an ANDA applicant 
is permitted to assert a counterclaim requiring the holder of the 
NDA to correct or delete the patent information on the ground that 
 
 95 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(C) (Supp. 2005). 
 96 Id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(II). 
 97 Id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(III). 
 98 See Laura B. Pincus, The Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement Actions, 5 
HARV. J.L. & TECH, 95, 95–99 (1991) (noting that the fact of patent infringement 
establishes the fact of damages because the patentees right to exclude has been violated). 
 99 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii)(I) (Supp. 2005). 
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the patent does not claim either the drug for which the application 
was approved or an approved method of using the drug.100  This 
provision was included in the legislation because a Federal Circuit 
case101 had found that the FDA’s duty in listing patents in the 
Orange Book is purely ministerial and, therefore, the FDA is under 
no obligation to review the appropriateness of the listing.102  The 
FDA has no duty to review the patents submitted by the NDA 
holder or to assess whether the claims in these patents cover the 
approved drug.103  In addition, the FDA does not determine if a 
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted against 
the unauthorized sale of the drug.104  The provision does not permit 
the generic to recover damages from a successful counterclaim.105  
De-listing counterclaims, however, could serve to facilitate an 
early resolution of ANDA patent infringement suits.106 
B. The 180-Day Exclusivity Period 
Second, Congress addressed the statutory scheme surrounding 
the 180-day market exclusivity period awarded to the first ANDA 
filer to invalidate the protecting patent.  Specifically, Congress 
replaced the traditional court decision “trigger” with a more 
complex set of provisions.107  The original Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments provided that either the first commercial marketing 
by the ANDA filer or the date of a district court decision triggered 
the 180-day exclusivity period.108  A district court decision trigger 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Apotex, Inc. v. Thomson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 102 Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust Implications of Patent 
Settlements: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 14 
(2001) (statement of Gary Buehler, Acting Director, Office of Generic Drugs, Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research, Food, and Drug Administration). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Sutherland, Asbill, & Brennan LLP, Legal Alert: Significant Changes for 
Prescription Drug Patent Holders, NDA Holders, and Generics (Jan. 30, 2004), at 3, 
available at http://www.sablaw.com/practice/practice_detail.aspx?sSubType=Z& 
iPractice_ID=26126003&sType=A&sPType=A [hereinafter Sutherland, Asbill & 
Brennan Legal Alert]. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D) (Supp. 2005). 
 108 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–58 (2003). 
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forced ANDA applicants to decide whether to market the product 
under the threat of reversal by an appellate court or risk loss of the 
exclusivity period.  Under the new legislation, a district court 
decision is not a triggering event, but the first commercial 
marketing trigger is maintained, subject to forfeiture.109  These 
forfeiture events include: (i) the generic applicant’s failure to 
market the drug within seventy-five days of approval or thirty 
months after submission of its ANDA, whichever is earlier (or 
within seventy-five days of a final decision of an appellate court, if 
later); (ii) ANDA application withdrawal or amendment or the 
withdrawal of a paragraph IV certification; (iii) failure to obtain 
tentative approval within thirty months of an ANDA filing; (iv) 
entry into an agreement that is found by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) or an appellate court to be in violation of the 
antitrust laws; and (v) expiration of all patents certified by the 
generic applicant.110  If any forfeiture event occurs, the first ANDA 
filer loses its 180-day exclusivity period. 
Prior to the Medicare Amendments, manufacturers 
occasionally entered into anticompetitive agreements in an attempt 
to block market entry of competitive generic products.111  In many 
of these agreements, a generic manufacturer entitled to the 180-day 
marketing exclusivity period would agree to delay launch so as not 
to trigger the exclusivity period.112  Because competing generic 
applicants could not obtain FDA approval until the expiration of 
the exclusivity period, such agreements effectively closed the 
market to all generics. 113  As a remedy, the Medicare Amendments 
require that all agreements between an ANDA filer (that has filed a 
paragraph IV certification) and a brand-name manufacturer or 
between two ANDA filers which concern the manufacturing, 
marketing or sale of either the brand-name or generic drug or the 
180-day exclusivity period be filed with the FTC and the 
Department of Justice.114  Past decisions by the FTC indicate that 
 
 109 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D) (Supp. 2005). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See supra Part I.C. 
 112 Tong, supra note 32, at 793. 
 113 Id. at 793–94. 
 114 Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan Legal Alert, supra, note 105, at 4. 
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agreements that include payments by the brand-name manufacturer 
in excess of litigation costs and those requiring a delay of market 
entry by the generic are those most likely to raise a red flag.115  
Although these provisions are in place, the Medicare Amendments 
provide that these new forfeiture provisions are not retroactive and 
are effective only with respect to those applications filed after 
December 8, 2003, for which no paragraph IV certification was 
made before December 8, 2003.116 
C. Thirty-Month Stay Provision 
Third, in response to abuses of the Hatch-Waxman framework 
arising from multiple automatic thirty-month stays, the Medicare 
Amendments may limit innovators to only one thirty-month stay 
per ANDA application.117  As previously mentioned, the FDA has 
no authority to evaluate patents listed in the Orange Book.118  Prior 
to the Medicare Amendments, each newly issued, newly listed 
patent would trigger an additional thirty-month stay, thereby 
further delaying FDA approval of any ANDA application.119  
Under the Medicare Amendments, only patents listed in the 
Orange Book at the time the generic application is filed may 
provide the statutory basis for a thirty-month stay.120  Therefore, 
patents issued and listed in the Orange Book subsequent to the 
ANDA filing are subject to the certification and notice provisions 
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments but cannot trigger an 




 115 W. Edward Bailey et al., Recent Hatch-Waxman Reform: Balancing Innovation, 
Competition, and Affordability, http://www.buildingipvalue.com/05_NA/107_110.htm 
(last accessed Oct. 18, 2005). 
 116 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108–173, §1102(b), 117 Stat. 2066, 2460 (2003). 
 117 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2005). 
 118 See supra Part II.A. 
 119 Michael Padden & Thomas Jenkins, Hatch-Waxman Changes, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 23, 
2004, at 13. 
 120 Id. 
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III. AUTHORIZED GENERICS 
A number of trends have emerged in the battle between 
innovators and generics to capitalize on the lucrative business of 
selling pharmaceuticals.  One new and controversial tactic 
employed by innovators is the “authorized generic,” which is a 
licensing arrangement that allows a generic manufacturer to market 
a brand-name drug with a generic label.  This results in increased 
competition for ANDA applicants.  The drug industry has 
presented data that more than two dozen authorized generics have 
been launched since 2003.121  For example, in January 2004, Eon 
Labs (the ANDA applicant) began marketing a generic copy of 
Wellbutrin SR, after having secured a 180-day marketing 
exclusivity period.122  At the same time, GlaxoSmithKline (the 
NDA holder) released an authorized generic, which undercut the 
value of the exclusivity period that Eon Labs had been awarded 
after challenging GlaxoSmithKline’s patent.123  According to 
industry experts, the six-month window during which other 
generics are excluded from the market provides immense profits to 
the ANDA holder.124  Therefore, if an authorized generic were 
released during the exclusivity period, the generic that undertook 
the process of challenging the innovator’s “meritless” patent would 
not be rewarded with the same amount of profit because of the 
increased competition posed by the authorized generic. 
In authorizing a generic to market its drug, the goal for 
innovators is to retain a portion of the market during the 180-day 
exclusivity period awarded to ANDA applicants subsequent to 
paragraph IV challenges.  Under this type of arrangement, the 
authorized generic will usually replace the brand-name 
manufacturer’s label with its own.125  Because the authorized 
generic is selling the brand-name drug rather than a generic version 
of the brand-name drug, its sale is not prohibited during the ANDA 
 
 121 Singer, supra note 13, at 1E. 
 122 See id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P–0262/CP1, at 4 (June 9, 
2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/June04/061004/04p-
0261-cp00001-01-vol1.pdf [hereinafter Teva Petition]. 
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filer’s exclusivity period.126  As would be expected, such an 
arrangement most likely will include an agreement that the 
authorized generic share its profits with the innovator in 
consideration for the license.127  By selling the innovator’s already 
approved drug, the authorized generic sidesteps the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments’ statutory language, which only prohibits 
non-approved ANDA applicants from selling the drug during that 
period of exclusivity.128 
Because the authorization may give another generic company 
the opportunity to enter the market quickly even if it is not the first 
ANDA applicant entitled to the period of exclusivity, the ANDA 
filer who has obtained the 180-day exclusivity period is usually 
compelled to lower its prices because of the increased 
competition.129  Generics argue that such arrangements decrease 
the profits and incentives of the first ANDA filer who assumed the 
risk of a patent infringement suit.130  Therefore, allowing 
authorized generics to enter the market during that time serves as a 
penalty for the applicant who is successful in obtaining a 180-day 
exclusivity period. 
A. Opponents of Authorized Generics 
In 2004, several generics filed Citizen Petitions with the FDA 
to seek prohibition of the marketing and distribution of reduced-
price authorized generic versions of brand-name products during 
an ANDA applicant’s 180-day exclusivity period.  In the first half 
of 2004, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Mylan”)131 and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva”)132 submitted petitions to the 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Mylan Pharm., Inc., Citizen Petition, 2004P–0075/CP1, at 1 (Feb. 17, 2004), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/feb04/021804/04p-0075-
cp00001-vol1.pdf [hereinafter Mylan Petition]. 
 132 Teva Petition, supra note 125, at 6. 
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FDA on the issue of authorized generics and Apotex Corporation 
(“Apotex”)133 filed a comment in support of Mylan’s petition. 
In its February 17, 2004, Citizen Petition, Mylan argued that 
authorized generics are “generic” drugs and therefore subject to the 
prohibitions on marketing generic drugs during the exclusivity 
period awarded to the first generic applicant.134  Mylan further 
argued that the “emerging trend” of marketing authorized generics 
“will negatively affect the incentive given to generic manufacturers 
to challenge drug patents.”135 
In the petitions, the generics contend that allowing licensing 
agreements between authorized generics and innovators cripples 
the generic manufacturer’s ability to derive a higher profit margin 
during the exclusivity period, which is when generics usually 
recoup the litigation costs incurred in challenging patents.136  
Without the financial reward, generics argue they will have little 
incentive to challenge patents, especially patents protecting drugs 
with modest sales.137  Further, they allege that authorized generics 
will eventually obstruct consumers’ access to lower-priced drugs in 
the long term.138  At the same time, innovators dispute these claims 
by arguing that such licenses promote early introduction of 
multiple competitive products and allow consumers expedited 
access to lower-priced generics139—goals that are aligned with the 
intent of Congress in passing the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and 





 133 Apotex Corp., Comment of Apotex Corp. in Support of Citizen Petition Docket No. 
2004P-0075/CP1, at 4 (March 24, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/apr04/040204/04P-0075-emc00001.pdf (filed in support of 
Mylan Petition) [hereinafter Apotex Comment]. 
 134 Mylan Petition, supra note 131, at 1. 
 135 Id. at 2. 
 136 See Teva Petition, supra note 125, at 6. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See Apotex Comment, supra note 133, at 4. 
 139 FDA, FDA TALK PAPER: FDA SUPPORTS BROADER ACCESS TO LOWER PRICED DRUGS 
(July 2, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/2004/ANS01296.html. 
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B. Current State of Law Regarding Authorized Generics 
The FDA rejected both Teva’s and Mylan’s Citizen Petitions in 
a July 2, 2004 ruling.140  The FDA stated that it would not prohibit 
authorized generics from marketing an innovator’s drug during the 
first ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period.141  The FDA found that 
this decision would advance the goal of more rapid access to 
lower-priced prescription drugs because authorized generics 
increase early competition and allow consumers more rapid access 
to lower-priced drugs,142 particularly during the exclusive 180-day 
period when the prices for generic drugs are often higher than they 
are after other generic manufacturers are able to enter the 
market.143  By emphasizing that the FDA does not generally 
review business dealings between drug manufacturers,144 the FDA 
also clarified that its mission is to protect and promote the public 
health.145  The FDA concluded that the marketing of authorized 
generics is a pro-competitive business practice, and that, therefore, 
it would not intervene as the petitioners had requested.146 
In the December 23, 2004 decision, in Teva Pharmaceuticals, 
Industries, Ltd. v. FDA,147 the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia also refused to intervene on behalf of a 
generic’s action challenging the FDA’s ruling.148  The district court 
found that the FDA had given effect to the plain and unambiguous 
language of the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.149  
The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA, holding 
that the FDA’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary 
 
 140 Letter from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, 
Department of Health & Human Services, to Stuart A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer, 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., and James N. Czaban, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe 
LLP (July 2, 2004) (denying Mylan and Teva Petitions), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/04/july04/070704/04p-0261-pdn0001.pdf 
[hereinafter FDA Ruling]. 
 141 Id. at 13. 
 142 Id. at 10. 
 143 Id. at 12. 
 144 Id. at 3. 
 145 See id. at 5. 
 146 Id. at 13. 
 147 Teva Pharm., Indus. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 148 See id. 
 149 Id. at 117–18. 
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to law.150  Teva filed an appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals, in the District of Columbia Circuit.151  However, on June 
3, 2005, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision.152 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FDA AND DISTRICT  
COURT’S DECISIONS 
The FDA’s July 2, 2004 ruling153 and the court’s decision in 
Teva Pharmaceuticals, Industries, Ltd, v. FDA154 are out of sync 
with the spirit of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the 
Medicare Amendments.  The history of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments clearly demonstrates that innovators will exploit 
loopholes in the statutory language to squeeze out as much market 
share as possible when faced with generic competition.155  By 
taking a strict statutory approach in their decisions, the FDA and 
the court in Teva tip the balance in favor of innovator control in the 
pharmaceutical market.  While this tipping may be a nod to 
Congress to again address loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman 
legislation, the FDA and the Teva court decisions perpetuate the 
cycle of abuse instead of curtailing it.  The FDA and the Teva court 
decisions suggest that Congress intended to exclude authorized 
generics from the requirements and prohibitions imposed on other 
generics because authorized generics are not specifically addressed 
in the legislation.  However, this approach is inflexible to the 
design of legislation that was meant to foster a healthy balance 
between generics and innovators. 
The FDA makes three main arguments in support of its refusal 
to prohibit authorized generics from marketing during an ANDA 
applicant’s exclusivity period: (i) the authorized generics are 
marketing a brand-name product, not a generic product;156 (ii) the 
 
 150 Id. at 117–19. 
 151 Teva Pharm., Indus. v. FDA, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 152 Id. 
 153 FDA Ruling, supra note 140. 
 154 355 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 155 See supra Part I.C. 
 156 FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 3–6. 
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FDA does not have the authority to regulate commercial marketing 
arrangements;157 and (iii) authorized generics do not undermine the 
goal of the Hatch-Waxman legislation to bring more affordable 
pharmaceuticals to the market.158  These arguments remain 
unpersuasive for the following reasons: (i) in a previous ruling, the 
FDA found that an authorized generic had marketed a generic 
product (rather than a brand-name product) for the purpose of 
triggering a 180-day exclusivity period;159 (ii) the FDA has broad 
powers to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of 
the FDCA;160 and (iii) allowing innovators to license their drugs to 
an authorized generic undermines the incentive for generics to 
challenge meritless patents.  This final factor is contrary to one of 
the major provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments—to 
promote competition in the pharmaceutical market. 
A. Definition of Authorized Generic 
First, the FDA’s ruling refused to equate authorized generics 
with generics that seek approval through an ANDA filing.161  This 
is inconsistent with a previous FDA ruling, dated February 6, 
2001,162 and a federal district court decision.163  No language or 
provision in the Hatch-Waxman legislation directly addresses the 
marketing of authorized generics during an ANDA applicant’s 
exclusivity period.  However, opponents of these licensing 
agreements argue that no other generic, authorized or not, should 
be permitted on the market during the 180-day exclusivity 
period.164 
 
 157 Id. at 6–7. 
 158 Id. at 12–13. 
 159 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476 (N.D. W. Va. 2001). 
 160 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000). 
 161 See FDA Ruling, supra note 140. 
 162 See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director of Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, Department of Health & Human Services, to Deborah A. Jaskot, Senior 
Director Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. (February 6, 2001) 
(granting Teva Citizen Petition dated August 9, 2000), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Mar01/030501/pav0001.pdf. 
 163 Mylan Pharm., 207 F. Supp. 2d 476. 
 164 See generally Apotex Comment, supra note 133. 
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In support of that assertion, opponents cite a case, Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson,165 where the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia made 
determinations about authorized generics in another context and 
supported the February 6, 2001, FDA ruling.166  Mylan began 
marketing a version of Pfizer’s Procardia (nifedipine) product 
pursuant to an agreement with Pfizer to settle patent infringement 
litigation for the drug.167  At the time (prior to the enactment of the 
Medicare Amendments), the earlier of a court decision finding the 
patent at issue not infringed or invalid, or the commercial 
marketing of the drug product by an eligible ANDA, triggered the 
180-day exclusivity period.168  The issue in the case was whether 
the exclusivity period had been triggered when Mylan began 
marketing Pfizer’s drug as an authorized generic.169  Mylan argued 
that the 180-day period had not been triggered because no such 
court ruling had been issued and Mylan was marketing a version of 
Pfizer’s product, rather than Mylan’s own nifedipine product, for 
which it had sought approval in the ANDA.170  Nevertheless, the 
district court determined that the marketing of an NDA holder’s 
product by the holder of an approved ANDA application who is 
eligible for 180-day exclusivity for that same drug product 
constitutes “commercial marketing” under the statute and triggers 
the 180-day exclusivity period.171  The district court agreed with 
the FDA’s previous determination that 
whether Mylan markets the produc[t] approved in its 
ANDA or [whether] the product approved is Pfizer’s NDA 
is of little import to the statutory scheme; Mylan has begun 
commercial marketing of generic nifedipine, permitting 
Mylan to market nifedipine without triggering the 
 
 165 Mylan Pharm., 207 F. Supp. 2d 476. 
 166 See id. 
 167 Id. at 481. 
 168 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457–58 
(2003). 
 169 Mylan Pharm., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 481–82. 
 170 Id. at 483. 
 171 Id. at 488. 
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beginning of exclusivity would be inconsistent with the 
intent of the statutory scheme.172 
Opponents of the FDA’s July 2, 2004 decision, finding that 
authorized generics are not prohibited from marketing a brand-
name drug during the 180-day exclusivity period, argue that the 
Mylan decision establishes a precedent for treating “brand generics 
as the legal and functional equivalents of ANDA generics for 
purposes of applying and enforcing the 180-day exclusivity 
period . . . .”173  Therefore, opponents argue, an authorized generic 
violates the statute when it markets the brand-name drug during the 
180-day exclusivity period of the first ANDA applicant.  Even 
though the district court in Mylan specifically refers to the 
activities of an authorized generic as the “commercial marketing of 
generic nifedipine,”174 the FDA’s recent ruling insists that when an 
authorized generic markets the drug, it is still a brand-name drug 
although it is not identified as such. 
The July 2, 2004 FDA ruling distinguishes the Mylan case and 
offers another interpretation of the language of the statute.  In that 
ruling, the FDA argues that, in Mylan, the statutory interpretation 
is that the 180-day exclusivity period could be triggered by the 
“first commercial marketing” of “the drug” by an ANDA applicant 
eligible for the 180-day exclusivity.175  However, the FDA found 
that this interpretation was narrowly confined to section 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and did not 
establish a broad policy regarding authorized generics.176  In other 
words, “the drug” could mean a generic version or a brand-name 
version in this context, as long as the manufacturer who marketed 
it was the eligible ANDA applicant.  In addition, the marketing by 
the ANDA applicant of either of these drugs sufficed to trigger the 
180-day exclusivity period. 
According to the July 2, 2004 ruling, the Mylan case did not 
preclude an NDA holder from “market[ing] or otherwise 
 
 172 Id. (emphasis added). 
 173 Teva Petition, supra note 125, at 3. 
 174 Mylan Pharm, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 488. 
 175 FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 10. 
 176 Id. 
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arrang[ing] for the distribution of authorized generic versions of its 
own product during a 180-day exclusivity period.”177  The FDA 
found further support for this interpretation in its practice of 
“allowing NDA holders to make manufacturing changes, including 
labeling and imprint changes, that permit the marketing of 
authorized generic versions of their products during 180-day 
exclusivity periods.”178  The FDA seems to liken licensing 
arrangements that permit an authorized generic to distribute an 
unidentified brand-name product at a generic price to situations 
where an innovator makes minor labeling changes and continues to 
distribute the brand-name product at a premium price. 
Even though this new tactic may mirror innovators’ previous 
maneuvers, the FDA and the circuit court dismiss the spirit of the 
Hatch-Waxman legislation by refusing to construe a broader 
interpretation of the statute.  The FDA’s recent ruling takes a 
conservative position by a strict construction of the statute.  This 
ruling may possibly be in deference to the newness of the 
Medicare Amendments.  In the period of time between the above-
mentioned FDA rulings, Congress enacted the Medicare 
Amendments, which addressed various loopholes in the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments that had been exploited by innovators.179  
However, the Medicare Amendments failed to address the 
marketing of authorized generics.  In the Medicare Amendments, 
Congress addressed the practice by which innovators had been 
entering into competition-stifling agreements with generics who 
had been granted a 180-day period of market exclusivity.180  
Congress created forfeiture events to prevent the practice that 
sought to keep an ANDA applicant’s 180-day period from being 
triggered.181  Specifically, the first ANDA applicant can forfeit its 
180-day exclusivity period by entering into an agreement with 
another ANDA applicant, the NDA-holder, or a patent owner 
which results in an unfair method of competition.182  Since the 
 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 11. 
 179 See supra Part II. 
 180 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (Supp. 2005). 
 181 See id. § 355(j)(5)(D). 
 182 Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V). 
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Medicare Amendments effectively prevented these competition-
stifling agreements,183 innovators have resorted to the present 
tactic of the use of the authorized generic.  Thus, the purpose of the 
Hatch-Waxman legislation is circumvented and the balance is 
tipped in favor of the brand-name manufacturers. 
Nevertheless, the new licensing arrangements with authorized 
generics are a hybrid of the agreements that had previously been 
negotiated between innovators and generics and that would now 
result in a forfeiture of the ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period.184  
In each arrangement, an innovator attempts to capitalize on the 
market of a brand-name drug while frustrating a generic’s attempt 
to market the drug.  Although the current tactic is not used to stop 
the 180-day exclusivity period from triggering, the licensing 
arrangement creates an artificial generic during a period when no 
other generic is supposed to be on the market.  Thus, the FDA 
disregards the plain meaning of the word “exclusive” in its refusal 
to prohibit these artificial generics from marketing a particular 
drug during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period.  The FDA’s 
ruling is contrary to one of the central provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman legislation because it allows innovators to undermine a 
generic’s incentive to assume the risk of patent infringement suits. 
B. Authority of the FDA 
The FDA refuses to recognize its broad power under the FDCA 
to prohibit authorized generics from marketing during an ANDA 
applicant’s exclusivity period.  While the FDA was willing to 
make a determination in Mylan185 about the arrangement between 
Mylan and Pfizer licensing Mylan to market an authorized generic 
version of Pfizer’s Procardia,186 the FDA has recently taken a 
hands-off approach to such licensing arrangements.  In its July 2, 
2004 rejection of Teva’s and Mylan’s Citizen Petitions, the FDA 
stated that it “oversees the changes that holders of approved 
ANDAs and NDAs make to their products to enable the marketing 
 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476 (N.D.W. Va. 2001). 
 186 See supra Part IV.A. 
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arrangements they wish to pursue.”187  In addition, the FDA stated 
that it “does not consider the underlying marketing objectives or 
the competitive implications of the changes being made, only their 
implications for the public health.”188  Finally, the FDA stated that 
it has no duty under the statute to prohibit such marketing or to 
afford any right of protection for the ANDA applicant.189 
Instead, the FDA characterized its role in the pharmaceutical 
industry as the regulator of safety and efficacy.190  Thus, the FDA 
focuses on the issue of the bioequivalence in the approval process 
of ANDAs.191  This approach also assumes that authorized 
generics need not be “approved” because the drug has already been 
approved by the NDA holder.192  Therefore, the authorized generic 
is characterized as a “manufacturing change,” and the FDA found 
that “NDA holders have long made such manufacturing changes as 
well.”193  As long as there are no manufacturing changes that pose 
safety and effectiveness concerns, the FDA argues that the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments do not prohibit an NDA holder’s use of 
alternative marketing practices for its own approved new drug.194 
By taking this approach, the FDA ignores its broad power 
under the FDCA “to promulgate regulations for the efficient 
enforcement of [the FDCA] . . . .”195  This provision empowers the 
FDA to implement the FDCA as Congress intended.  The FDA 
relied on this power in the Mylan proceeding to determine whether 
the authorized marketing of Pfizer’s nifedipine product triggered 
the 180-day exclusivity period.196  In Mylan, the district court 
stated that 
an agency[,] in administering a program created by 
Congress, must be allowed to formulate policy and make 
 
 187 FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 5. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. at 2, 4–6. 
 190 See id. at 2, 4. 
 191 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000); CBO REPORT ON EFFECT OF GENERIC DRUGS IN 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 69, at xii, 2. 
 192 See FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 6–7. 
 193 FDA ruling, supra note 140, at 4–5. 
 194 See id. at 2, 5; Andrx Petition, supra note 8, at 6. 
 195 See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000). 
 196 See Mylan v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481–83 (N.D. W.Va. 2001). 
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rules to fill a ‘gap’ which has been left, implicitly or 
explicitly, by Congress.  There is an express delegation of 
authority to an agency to fill by regulation a gap explicitly 
left open by Congress.197 
Even though Congress closed several loopholes in the 
Medicare Amendments that innovators were abusing, the FDA 
refuses to recognize that authorized generics are likely abusing a 
loophole that Congress failed to address. 
C.  Policy 
The FDA’s failure to prohibit authorized generics from 
marketing during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period 
undermines the Hatch-Waxman Amendments’ goal of balancing 
incentives for generics so that they are encouraged to challenge 
innovators’ patents.  Although the FDA asserts a policy argument 
in support of its refusal to delay the marketing of authorized 
generics, this argument takes a short-sighted and narrow view of 
the goals of the statute.  The FDA argues that the legislative intent 
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is to benefit the consuming 
public “‘through the prompt availability of lower cost generic 
drugs’ and [] to allow the eligible ANDA applicant to reap the 
benefits of 180 days of marketing exclusivity” without competition 
from other ANDA applicants.198  The FDA found that its 
interpretation is consistent with the principles of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments because the interpretation 
does not unduly favor either first ANDA applicants or 
NDA holders; it merely permits NDA holders to pursue 
competitive marketing strategies . . . .  In fact, a contrary 
interpretation arguably would unduly favor first ANDA 
applicants, to the detriment of the public interest that is 
 
 197 Id. at 487. 
 198 FDA Ruling, supra note 140, at 10 (quoting Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Deborah A. Jaskot, Senior Director, 
Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USC, Inc., in response to Nifedipine Petition, 
at 7–8 (Feb. 6, 2001)). 
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promoted through encouragement of competition and, 
thereby, of lower prices in the pharmaceutical market.199 
On the other hand, opponents argue that permitting authorized 
generics to market drugs during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity 
period interprets the statute in a way that excessively favors 
innovators.200  If an NDA holder licenses an authorized generic to 
market a brand-name drug at a reduced price during the exclusivity 
period, opponents argue that this could reasonably be expected to 
diminish the ANDA holder’s economic benefit because there are 
three versions of the drug on the market: (i) the brand-name drug, 
(ii) the ANDA holder’s generic, and (iii) the authorized generic.201  
There is an obvious competition between the NDA holder’s 
“generic” version of the brand-name drug and an ANDA holder’s 
generic drug.  The NDA holder’s “generic” drug would not exist 
without the licensing arrangement.  Regardless, the FDA found 
that any “such adverse economic effect is insufficient to justify the 
action requested [], even if the FDA had authority to grant the 
request.”202  The FDA argues that competition during the 180-day 
exclusivity period actually furthers the objective of enhancing 
competition overall among drug products.203  Specifically, the 
FDA argued that the competition posed by authorized generics 
“can be anticipated to encourage ANDA applicants to offer their 
products at lower prices during the exclusivity period, thereby 
reducing the substantial ‘mark-up’ ANDA applicants can often 
apply during the period, before approval of subsequent ANDA 
applicants increases competition.”204 
One of the fundamental problems with the FDA’s policy 
argument is that it trivializes the purpose of the 180-day 
exclusivity period.  According to the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments, the encouragement of competition and, 
thereby, lower prices in the pharmaceutical market, is not a one-
 
 199 Id. at 11. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 12. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id.  Mylan contests that issue, arguing that no pricing data “currently supports the 
bald assertion that authorized generics lower prices at a consumer level.” Id. at n.19. 
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step process.205  As innovators take financial risks in the research 
and development of new drugs, generics take financial risks in 
challenging innovators’ patents.  The Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments and the Medicare Amendments attempt to balance 
those risks with various incentives such as the 180-day exclusivity 
period for generics and patent extensions for innovators.206  
However, the 180-day exclusivity period serves another purpose as 
well.  Congress has recognized that innovators have filed multiple, 
meritless patents in an attempt to prolong patent life.207  At the 
same time, it has been determined that the FDA does not have a 
duty to police Orange Book listings to ensure that ineligible patents 
are not listed in the Orange Book.208  According to Ben Venue 
Labs, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp.,209 the FDA “has 
stated that it lacks the resources and the expertise to review patents 
submitted with NDAs, and that it intends listing disputes to be 
settled privately.”210  Therefore, generics who challenge allegedly 
meritless patents are effectively policing innovators from unjustly 
maintaining high, monopoly prices on drugs.  In support of the 
theory that lawsuits are the method to dismantle innovators’ 
monopoly-hold on the market, a recent FTC study found that when 
generics do bring patent challenges, their allegations are 
meritorious—”generic applicants prevailed in nearly 75% of the 
patent litigation ultimately resolved by a court decision.”211  Yet 
the FDA’s failure to prohibit authorized generics from marketing 
during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period undermines this 
process by tipping the balancing of the incentives in favor of 
innovators. 
It could be argued that generics will continue to bring patent 
challenges regardless of whether or not authorized generics are 
around because the potential financial rewards are still present.  
Therefore, the legislative goal of increasing the availability of 
 
 205 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (1999), amended by 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (Supp. 2005). 
 206 See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1074–76 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 207 See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 60, at 52–56; Waxman Statement 
Regarding Hearing on Affordable Pharmaceuticals, supra note 15. 
 208 See aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 209 Ben Venue Labs, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 210 Id. at 456. 
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affordable pharmaceuticals may not truly be threatened by 
allowing innovators to use authorized generics.  Although the long-
term effects of this practice can only be speculated, it is clear that 
innovators have an added weapon in their arsenal that puts a 
damper on a generic’s supposed victory after winning a patent 
challenge. 
V. ANOTHER APPROACH—LABELING 
A. Pending Citizen Petition with the FDA 
The FDA has an opportunity to potentially level the playing 
field between innovators and generics in a ruling on a pending 
petition.  In a Citizen Petition filed on December 23, 2004 with the 
FDA, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Andrx”) seeks to prohibit the 
marketing of authorized generics on another theory.212  Andrx 
planned to market a generic form of methylphenidate 
hydrochloride, an attention deficit drug, while the NDA holder 
McNeil Consumer and Speciality Pharmaceuticals (“McNeil”) 
planned to license its attention deficit drug Concerta® to an 
authorized generic.213  In a move to block the licensing agreement, 
Andrx proposed that authorized generics are misbranded under 
section 502(a) of the FDCA and, therefore, are false, misleading 
and anticompetitive.214  Specifically, Andrx argued that a drug 
label “can convey a misleading representation by implication or by 
omission of material information, as well as by express 
statements.”215  The FDCA provides in relevant part that “[a]mong 
representations in the labeling of a drug which render such drug 
misbranded is a false or misleading representation with respect to 
another drug or a device or a food or cosmetic.”216  In essence, the 
argument is that consumers and healthcare professionals are misled 
as to the true manufacturer of authorized generics and are, 
therefore, not receiving truthful and accurate information about the 
 
 212 Andrx Petition, supra note 8. 
 213 Id. at 1–2. 
 214 Id. at 2–3. 
 215 Id. at 6. 
 216 21 C.F.R. § 201.6(a) (2005). 
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drug product.  This works to the detriment of consumers because 
they pay more for a brand-name drug—which they assume has a 
greater therapeutic effect—when the same drug is actually 
available at a lower price. 
In further support its argument, Andrx argues that the FDA has 
previously prohibited the business practice of mislabeling brand-
name drugs that mislead consumers.217  Specifically, Andrx makes 
a “man in the plant” argument.  In the 1970s, some brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies employed a practice of hiring smaller 
companies to manufacture their drugs for sale with the drug’s 
brand-name label.218  To supervise this manufacture, the brand-
name company would send a “man in the plant” to “supervise” the 
manufacturing process.219  Companies then placed their brand on 
the label, claiming to have manufactured the drug, and charged the 
brand-name price.220  However, the FDA stopped this business 
practice, finding that the “man in the plant” supervision was only 
nominal.221 
Andrx argues that the practice of authorized generics is 
essentially similar, although it works in reverse.222  Instead of 
placing a brand-name on a product manufactured by a generic, the 
practice allows innovators to put a generic label on a brand-name 
drug.  Consumers are misled by this practice because they buy the 
brand-name version while the same drug made by the same 
company is available more cheaply. 
In response to Andrx’s petition, McNeil submitted an 
opposition comment to the FDA on February 25, 2005.223  McNeil 
argued that Andrx failed to allege 
 
 217 See Andrx Petition, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
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available at  http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04p0563/04p-0563-c000001-01-
vol1.pdf (filed in opposition to Andrx’s Petition, 2004P-0563). 
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any legally relevant FDCA violation related to generic drug 
bioequivalence or adulteration, or any violation of FDA’s 
careful and deliberate regulatory process with respect to the 
labeling of products approved under both the NDA and 
ANDA processes.  Although Andrx’s argument is based on 
the alleged omission of information from labeling, its 
arguments do not satisfy the FDCA’s definition of 
misleading labeling found at Section 201(n), which focuses 
on the consequences of using the drug as recommended in 
the labeling at issue in the light of any omitted material 
fact.224 
Essentially, McNeil argues that Andrx has failed to identify 
any safety or efficacy issue with the labeling of authorized generics 
and, therefore, has failed to prove that the label is misleading.225 
Section 201(n) of the FDCA provides: 
If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the 
labeling or advertising is misleading, then in determining 
whether the labeling or advertising is misleading there shall 
be taken into account (among other things) not only 
representations made or suggested by statement, word, 
design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the 
extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal 
facts material in the light of such representations or 
material with respect to consequences which may result 
from the use of the article to which the labeling or 
advertising relates under the conditions of use prescribed in 
the labeling or advertising thereof or under such conditions 
of use as are customary or usual.226 
In a June 24, 2005 letter,227 the FDA delayed its decision 
regarding the Petition, due to “other Agency priorities.”228 
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 225 See id. at 4–5. 
 226 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2000). 
 227 Letter from Jane A. Axelrad, Associate Director for Policy, Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research, to David L. Rosen, Foley & Lardner LLP (June 24, 2005), 
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B. The Labeling Resolution 
The importance of accurate labeling of drugs is clear for 
various safety reasons.  The prohibition of brand-name 
manufacturers’ use of the man-in-the-plant approach suggests a 
clear concern with practices that mislead consumers or that fail to 
disclose to consumers the actual manufacturer of a drug.  This 
assumes that there is merit in disclosing to consumers the 
manufacturer of a drug, even when issues of safety or efficacy are 
not implicated. 
Section 201.1(a) of the FDCA provides in part: “A drug or 
drug product . . . in finished package form is misbranded under 
section 502(a) and (b)(1) of the act if its label does not bear 
conspicuously the name and place of business of the manufacturer, 
packer, or distributor.”229  The FDCA goes on to define such a 
manufacturer as one who mixes, granulates, mills, molds, 
encapsulates and coats a drug product.230  In addition, the FDCA 
provides that the 
appearance on a drug product label of a person’s name 
without qualification is a representation that the named 
person is the sole manufacturer of the product.  That 
representation is false and misleading, and the drug product 
is misbranded under section 502(a) of the act, if the person 
is not the manufacturer of the product in accordance with 
this section.231 
Further, the statute requires that if a distributor is named on the 
label, the name shall be qualified by one of several phrases that 
specifies the manufacturer of and the distributor of the item.232 
To comply with the statute, the FDA should require that 
innovators accurately label authorized generics.  Specifically, 
authorized generics should clearly identify the brand-name 
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 229 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(a) (2005). 
 230 Id. § 201.1(b). 
 231 Id. § 201.1(h)(2). 
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connection.  If innovators were required to label their products as 
such, this might undermine the controversial tactic they are 
employing.  During an ANDA holder’s exclusivity period, an 
innovator will continue to sell its brand-name product at a 
premium price.  At the same time, the authorized generic will offer 
the product at a lower price and pay the innovator a portion of the 
proceeds.  If an innovator were required to identify the brand-name 
connection on the authorized generic’s label, consumer choice 
might be affected.  If consumers were aware that the authorized 
generic’s product is actually the same as the brand-name product, 
they would be less willing to pay the premium price for the brand-
name drug.  This may undercut the market of the brand-name drug 
sold by the innovator at the higher price.  Thus, this simple 
disclosure requirement might discourage innovators from making 
such licensing arrangements in the first place. 
Statutory language constrained the FDA and the federal courts 
from altogether banning an innovator’s use of an authorized 
generic during an ANDA applicant’s exclusivity period.  Yet, the 
statutory language of the FDCA seems to clearly require 
authorized generics to bear reference to the brand-name connection 
in the labeling of their product. 
CONCLUSION 
The high cost of healthcare is an issue of the utmost concern.  
A recent study found that wholesale prices for popular brand-name 
drugs increased by an average of 7.1 percent in 2004, which was 
more than twice the general inflation rate.233  At the same time, the 
study found that wholesale prices for seventy-five commonly used 
generic drugs rose only 0.5 percent in 2004.234  As is clear from the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments and the Medicare Amendments, 
Congress had a clear intent to foster early generic market entry of 
pharmaceutical products.  One of the central means of fostering 
that goal was granting ANDAs the 180-day exclusivity period.  In 
the congressional hearings that led to the Medicare Amendments, 
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Representative Henry Waxman stated that in the negotiations that 
culminated in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments there “was no one-
for-one trading of provisions.  Instead, we weighed all of the 
provisions to encourage innovation, taken as a whole, against all of 
the provisions to encourage generic competition, as a whole, and 
concluded that an appropriate balance had been struck.”235  In the 
Medicare Amendments, Congress attempted to restore the careful 
balance that had been undone by the actions of innovators.  
However, innovators have found another loophole in the statutory 
language.  It took almost twenty years for Congress to consider the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments for revision.  However, this was 
necessary due to plain abuse of loopholes in the legislation.  
Representative Waxman stated that innovators resorted to “creative 
lawyering” and “have not honored the careful balance struck by 
those Amendments.”236  Innovators are clearly utilizing creative 
lawyering again.  The history of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
should teach that loopholes will be exploited when there are great 
financial rewards.  Therefore, the FDA should require innovators 
to identify the brand-name connection on their labels for their 
authorized generic drugs to undercut this loophole which is 
undermining the careful balance of the law. 
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